Editorial: Looking back and forth

In a spectacular fashion and with only days to the Mexiko game Branko “found” Andranik and ordered him to run his shoes off in central midfield together with Nekounam. Branko had in the qualification fielded the exact same eleven over and over and now his stubborn “bias” towards a fading hero, Daei, forced him to play an unfit Ali Karimi in left midfield. Karimi had for years been running the show for “Team Melli” from offensive midfield but was now misplaced like never before. “The Asian Maradona” who had recently got back from injury was nowhere near fit and simply couldn’t participate either in defence nor offence from his new wide position.

A few years later the stubborn “bias” towards another fading hero, Hashemian, is evident. Daei picked an astonishing 32 different players from start in his eleven games in charge. Two of his conclusions in the end of his journey were to play Shojaei behind the striker (and not in left/right midfield) and to not play Hashemian from start. With a new general in charge came another two new players (Nosrati and Nouri) to add to the already 32 and much disappointingly the same conclusions/mistakes.

Before Iran’s stalemate in Pyongyang I talked about revolutionary football. I wanted to see Karimi and Masoud for the first time ever together in two central roles with Khalatbari and Mahdavikia in left and right. Since we knew the home side would play with a five-back and three central defenders I believed having one target forward would be too little. Instead I suggested no target forwards so there would be none to cross to but instead trust the individual skills of the mentioned players.

Much to my disappointment Afshin “the Emperor” did not agree with me. As I had predicted he went for a more “safe and sound” tactic. Iran controlled the game and gave almost nothing away but neither had they anything but ball possession. Symbolically it was Shojaei from an (just momentarily) offensive midfield position who single-handedly created Iran’s best and almost only goal scoring chance.

I’ve taken two screenshots that summarizes the game as well as any two could do. Korea DPR has lately developed their 5-4-1 to a 5-3-1-1 as they have given Hong-Yong their most creative player a more offensive position behind Chong Tese. In the first picture Karimi has the ball under control and the Korea DPR 5-3-1-1 is intact (except for Hong-Yong who should be where the X is). Karimi Iran’s playmaker will find space in front of the Korean left back (Ghotbi who knew his opponents talked about this ahead of the game and so did I) and Kabi will make his run. Notice the lack of tactical skills in the Korean team/defenders when Hashemian drops back and Mahdavikia cuts in at the same time (this is one reason to why Shojaei and Karimi both should have played in a 4-6-0). The second picture is taken at an entirely different time but it once more illustrates the very same situation. When Kabi has made his run and received his pass Hashemian will be too alone in the box against a five-back that is intact. Shojaei and Mahdavikia will end up too wide on the either side and Karimi will simply not make the run in to the box.

 

Looking ahead to Wednesday when Iran faces a far from full-strength UAE there could be many different approaches to the game but can there really be anything but a home victory? Undoubtedly it looks like there will be one or two more chapters to write about this World Cup journey…