The stadium was full and the fans in full voice, for the first time in a long time and in that regard there could be no complaints. On the pitch though, there was a different story. Long ball after long ball, you could be forgiven for thinking you were watching the legendary Wimbledon team of the 1980's, or Egil Olsen's Norway. But they both had 6'5 strikers ready to hold up the ball, not pint-sized Gholam Reza Rezaei, or the energetic, pacy, but physically skinny and short Khalatbari.
From the sluggish early start, both teams were happy to give the ball away far too many times, until Mehdi Mahdavikia, captain for the day, went through one on one, in what could have been a game changing moment. With a bit more professionalism, Mahdavikia, not the world's greatest goalscorer by any means, could have decided to cave into the tackle from behind that the last Saudi defender put out. But that may be far too critical of the Eintracht Frankfurt player. What we could criticize was the tame finish, which lacked any power or drive. The Saudis were a bit unlucky that a goal that they scored off a corner kick was chalked off for an infringement in the penalty area, and possibly just slightly less unlucky that a penalty wasnt awarded for Rahmati bringing down the advancing striker when it was one-on-one.
If we had to have a go and pick the bones out of the match, then its a case of basic Football 101. Firstly, Iran's main strategy in the first half especially was to launch long balls towards the strikers. But the strikers chosen were not the right type of players. That tactic would have been more useful in the second half, if Iran had pursued a dangerous counter-attacking game, but instead of aiming towards the strikers, the ball was being given away aimlessly. Defensively the full backs were being caught out with players going past them at ease, thus putting the center backs, Aghili and Hosseini, in trouble by forcing them wider than they would like to be, causing a problem as they are not the paciest players. The last thirty minutes of the match saw the Saudi's exploit the space behind both full backs to perfection. Iran's defensive line was not in unison and that allowed the Saudi's to get through. That is not to take away from some brilliant Saudi attacking, especially impressive as they had been missing quite a few regulars especially up front.
Questions that need to be answered, but probably never will are as follows. Why did Iran pull back after scoring? The first 15 minutes of the second half was Iran's best period of offensive football and had the Saudi's rattled. Brilliant triangular football, especially down Iran's right hand side created a number of opportunities and pressurized the visitors. But it all stopped a minute or two after Iran scored, with Mahdavikia's foray down the wing, and a cross that ended up being too close to the keeper. From that moment on, inexplicably Iran pulled back. It isnt clear if it was from under the instructions of Ali Daei or whether the players naturally began to defend the lead, but the former being the most likely cause, as Daei failed to elicit any change in the player's movement or strategy from that point onwards. Secondly, why was Iran's response or lack of response to being pegged back so tame? The Saudi's were fighting to get the ball back from the Iranian net to have the game re-started when it should have been the hosts who were in a hurry. In fact, Iran did not pose any danger at 1-1 and even with the introduction of an impotent Hashemian, the support and supply was lacking. The space between the three lines was too much especially between the top two lines, and this was especially evident at 1-2 when for the last 10 or so minutes of the match, Hashemian was isolated up front chasing lost causes with nobody interested to join him up front.
The major disappointment of the match was the lack of positive decision-making from the bench. Substitutions were not effective, and tactically pulling back the players so early in the second half was a lethal self-injected blow. In fact, Ali Daei's impression of Sven-Goran Eriksson was not what the doctor had ordered at 1-1.
At the time of going to press, it is still not clear whether Ali Daei is still the head coach or not. Irrespective of this, unless major changes are made within the team, Iran's slim chances to qualify for the World Cup will be none even before a ball is kicked in June. Organization and tactical discipline is the first key, and that is something that the last successful coach of Team Melli could not be criticized for. This Iranian team is clearly not one of the most talented ones, and therefore the sum of its parts must be greater than the individual parts and that is down to how the backroom staff lays the team out. This shout may be shot down before it leaves the buttons on the keyboard, but Branko Ivankovic may just be what the team needs. With backs against the wall and time running out, results are what are needed and not performances. To date both have been lacking during this stage of qualification and Ivankovic was king in getting results if nothing else. We may not like to admit it, but his achievements have been far more imprinted into recent memory as time has passed by.